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Depuis le ler avril 1995, on a modifi6 la ddfinition de <rdsident>> en vertu de la
Loi sur l'assurance-santi. En effet, les demandeurs de statut de r6fugi6 qui
vivent en Ontario ne peuvent plus b6n6ficier de la couverture du R6gime
d'assurance-maladie de l'Ontario (RAMO). Dans cet article, on se demande si
la nouvelle ddfinition de «r6sident>> est conforme avec les dispositions de la Loi
canadienne sur santi qui, selon le cas, pourrait forcer la province a modifier sa
ddfinition ou a renoncer A des paiements de transfert du gouvernement f6dral dans
le cadre des paiements de transfert de sant6 et sociaux du Canada. De plus, dans cet
article, on soutient qu'en refusant d'accorder aux demandeurs de statut de r6fugi6
la mrme couverture en soins de sant6 qu'aux autres personnes qui vivent en Ontario,
on enfreint l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s qui porte sur
un accis 6quitable garanti et qu'on ne saurait justifier par l'article 1.
The moral test of government is how it treats those who are in the dawn of
life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, the aged; and those
who are in the shadows of life - the sick, the needy and the handicapped.1
INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 1994, Ontario Health Minister Ruth Grier announced changes to
the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) eligibility rules.2 Many people living
in Ontario whom the government described as "temporary residents" ceased to
be eligible for health care coverage, and a three month residency requirement was
Copyright © 1996 Steve Sansom. Steve Sansom is a third year law student at the Uni-
versity of Toronto. This paper was originally written for the Intensive Poverty Law
Program of Osgoode Hall Law School at Parkdale Community Legal Services, Winter
Term 1996.
1. Former U.S. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, quoted in M. Valpy, 'Thoughts on a
Windy Comer" The Globe and Mail (29 March 1996) A21.
2. The initial change came in the form of 0. Reg. 490/94, made July 20, 1994, amending
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552 [hereinafter Reg. 552]. Refugee claimants became ineligible fol-
lowing the enactment of 0. Reg. 87/95, made February 22, 1995.
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introduced before coverage begins for otherwise qualified applicants. Refugee
claimants resident in Ontario were no longer eligible for OHIP following a one
year transition period, at which time the federal government assumed responsi-
bility for their health care costs under the Interim Federal Health Plan (IFH).3
The federal plan provides much less comprehensive coverage than OHIP. Only
"emergency and essential health care ' 4 is covered. In addition, the coverage is
not universal. In order to qualify, individuals must demonstrate that they have
insufficient funds to pay for their own health care.5
By its actions, the government of Ontario has created a class of people,
physically present in Ontario and legally entitled to remain, who do not receive
the same level of health care as is provided to the majority of the population. In
this article, it will be argued that this policy is inconsistent with the Canada
Health Act,6 and further that it violates the equality guarantee of section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms7 and cannot be justified under
section 1.
The effect of the change in OHIP regulations is not limited to refugee claimants.8
However, in order to provide some focus to this paper, it will be assumed
throughout that the individual challenging the legislation is a refugee claimant.
Therefore the deleterious effects of the legislation will be examined from the
perspective of a refugee claimant.
I. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE AMENDMENTS
The statutory authority for OHIP is the Health Insurance Act.9 Subsection 11 (1)
states that:
3. "OHIP Eligibility Fact Sheet", July 8, 1994; "Fact Sheet - Health Insurance Coverage
For Refugees" (circa March 1995).
4. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operations Memorandum IP 95-06 (revised 14
July 1995) at 5 [hereinafter Operations Memorandum].
5. Ibid. at 1.
6. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, s. 2.
7. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
8. In a statement to the Legislature, Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of
Debates (Hansard), (31 March 1994) at 5322, [hereinafter Statement to the Legislature]
the Honourable Ruth Grier, Minister of Health, estimated the change in the definition of
a resident would affect 66,000 people who were in the province at that time, of whom
28,000 were refugee claimants. The three month waiting period for a new resident to
receive benefits, introduced at the same time, would affect an additional unspecified
number of Ontarians.
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Every person who is a resident of Ontario is entitled to become an insured
person upon application therefor to the General Manager in accordance
with this Act and the regulations.
Prior to April 1, 1994, "resident" was defined in section 1 of the Act:
"resident" means a person who is legally entitled to remain in Canada and
who makes his or her home and is ordinarily present in Ontario, but does
not include a tourist, a transient or visitor to Ontario, and the verb has a cor-
responding meaning.
This definition was interpreted by the OHIP General Manager and by the Health
Services Appeal Board to include refugee claimants and others, such as foreign
students, who had temporary permission to remain in Canada and made Ontario
their home for that period. 10
Effective April 1, 1994, this definition of resident was repealed" and section
1.1 was added to Reg. 552:
1.1 (1) For the purposes of the Act, "resident" means an individual,
(a) who is present in Ontario by virtue of an employment authorization
issued under the Caribbean Commonwealth and Mexican Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Programme administered by the federal Depart-
ment of Citizenship and Immigration; or
(b) who is ordinarily resident in Ontario and who is one of the following:
1. A Canadian citizen or a landed immigrant under the Immigration Act
(Canada).
2. A person who is registered as an Indian under the Indian Act (Can-
ada).
3. A Convention refugee as defined in the Immigration Act (Canada).
4. A person who has submitted an application for landing under the
Immigration Act (Canada), who has not yet been granted landing and
who has been confirmed by the federal Department of Citizenship
and Immigration as having satisfied the medical requirements for
landing.
9. R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 6.
10. In the Matter of a Hearing under s. 20(1)(a) of the Health Insurance Act between Ian
Clarken and the General Manager, cf. note 23, The Ontario Health Insurance Plan (11
March 1996, H.S.A.B.) at 11-13 [hereinafter Clarken].
11. S.O. 1994, c. 17, s. 68(2) repealed the definition of resident and substituted the follow-
ing:
"resident" means a resident as defined in the regulations and the verb "reside"
has a corresponding meaning.
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5. [revoked]
12
6. A person who has finalized a contract of employment or an agree-
ment of employment with a Canadian employer situated in Ontario
and who, at the time the person makes his or her application to
become an insured person, holds an employment authorization under
the Immigration Act (Canada) which,
i. names the Canadian employer,
ii. states the person's prospective occupation, and
iii. has been issued for a period of at least six months.
7. The spouse or dependent child under the age of 19 years of a person
referred to in paragraph 6 if the Canadian employer provides the
General Manager with written confirmation of the employer's inten-
tion to employ the person referred to in paragraph 6 for a period of
three continuous years.
8. A member of the clergy of any religious denomination who has final-
ized an agreement of employment to minister on a full-time basis to a
religious congregation in Ontario for a period of not less than six
continuous months and whose duties will consist mainly of preaching
doctrine, presiding at liturgical functions and spiritual counselling.
9. The spouse and dependent children under the age of 19 years of a
member of the clergy referred to in paragraph 8 if the religious con-
gregation provides the General Manager with written confirmation
that it intends to employ the member for a period of at least three
consecutive years.
10. A person granted a minister's permit under section 37 of the
Immigration Act (Canada) which indicates on its face that the person
is a member of an inadmissible class designated as case type 86, 87,
88 or 89, or, if the permit is issued for the purpose of an adoption by
an insured person, as case type 80.
11. A person granted an employment authorization under the Live-in
Care Givers in Canada Programme or the Foreign Domestic Move-
12. Prior to the enactment of 0. Reg. 87/85, paragraph 5 read:
5. A person who has made a claim to be a Convention refugee under the Immigration
Act (Canada) and in respect of whom,
i. a senior immigration officer has determined that the person is eligible to have his
or her claim determined by the Refugee Division, and
ii. a removal order, as defined in the Immigration Act (Canada), has not been executed.
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ment administered by the federal Department of Citizenship and
Immigration.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is ordinarily resident in
Ontario only if,
(a) in the case of an insured person or of a person who comes to
Ontario from another province or territory in which that person
was insured by the provincial or territorial health insurance
authority, the person,
(i) makes his or her permanent and principle home in
Ontario, and
(ii) is present in Ontario for at least 183 days in any twelve-
month period; and
(b) in the case of a person who is applying to be an insured person
for the first time or who is re-establishing his or her entitlement
after having been uninsured for a period of time, other than a
person who comes to Ontario from another province or territory
in which that person was insured by the provincial or territorial
health insurance authority, the person,
(i) intends to make his or her permanent and principle home
in Ontario, and
(ii) is present in Ontario for,
(A) at least 183 days in the twelve-month period
immediately following the application, and
(B) at least 153 of the 183 days immediately following
the application.
At the same time, subsection 3(3) of Reg. 552 was amended to impose a
three-month waiting period before OHIP benefits accrue to a new resident other
than a newborn born in Ontario to an insured person or certain other new
residents. 13 Interestingly, one of the groups exempt from the three-month
waiting period is refugee claimants, and this exemption was not removed when
refugee claimants became ineligible for OHIP.
II. ARE THE NEW AMENDMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THE
CANADA HEALTH ACT?
The government of Ontario takes the position that the above definition of
resident is consistent with that contained in the Canada Health Act:
13. 0. Reg. 491/94, made July 20, 1994, s. 2.
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"resident" means, in relation to a province, a person lawfully entitled to be
or to remain in Canada who makes his home and is ordinarily present in the
province, but does not include a tourist, a transient or a visitor to the prov-
ince 14 .
(A) Previous Judicial Interpretations of "Resident"
The judicial interpretation of the word "resident" differs depending on the
purpose of the definition in the context of the impugned statute. Thus, the word
resident has a different meaning for immigration purposes, for income tax
purposes, and for health care purposes. There are two reported cases which
interpret the definition of resident for the purpose of provincial health coverage.
In both cases, the provincial statute at issue contained a definition of resident
substantially the same as the one in the Canada Health Act.
In Hernadi v. British Columbia (Minister of Health),15 McLachlin J.A. (as she
then was) held for the court that persons in British Columbia who hold student
visas, although visitors for the purpose of the Immigration Act, 16 are eligible
residents of B.C. for the purposes of the Medical Service Act 17 and the Hospital
Insurance Act. 18 She based her interpretation on two grounds. First, the Medical
Service Act also refers to a "permanent resident." If the definition of "resident"
excluded those with temporary authorization to remain in Canada, it would have
the same meaning as "permanent resident." By the principle of statutory inter-
pretation that different words in the same statute must mean different things,
"resident" must mean something different than "permanent resident" in the
Medical Service Act. 19
Her second, and I believe stronger, ground, is that if "resident" does not include
persons with temporary immigration authorizations, it would be restricted to
persons entitled "to remain" in Canada. This would render the words "to be" in
the definition of resident meaningless, "violating the canon of statutory con-
struction that every provision of an Act should, if possible, be given meaning."20
Thus, the Medical Service Act entitles two classes of B.C. residents to health
14. Canada Health Act, supra, note 6, s.2.
15. (1986), 34 D.L.R. (4th) 145 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Hernadi].
16. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
17. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 255.
18. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 180.
19. Hernadi, supra, note 15 at 148-49.
20. Ibid. at 149-50.
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care benefits: those entitled to make their home in Canada permanently, and
those entitled to make their home in Canada temporarily.
In Manassian v. Alberta (Minister of Health),2 1 the opposite conclusion was
reached. Murray J. held that the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act22 did not
entitle a refugee claimant to health care benefits. Murray J. took the position
that since the Act provided that one of the conditions of residence is that the
person must be "entitled to be or to remain in Canada," that the list of persons
in s. 4 of the Immigration Act who "have a right to come into or remain in
Canada" was determinative. Since refugee claimants do not come within s. 4 of
the Immigration Act, Murray J. concluded that they are not "lawfully entitled to
be or to remain in Canada," and therefore not residents. He distinguished
Hernadi by noting that in that case it was conceded that holders of visitor's visas
are lawfully in Canada, and therefore capable of being residents of B.C.
There are two arguments against this reasoning. First, while it is clear from the
Immigration Act that refugee claimants do not have the "right" to remain in
Canada, by the implication of s. 5 they are granted that "privilege" until their
claim is finally determined. It could be argued that one who has the "privilege"
of remaining in Canada is "entitled" to remain in Canada. Second, the Immigra-
tion Act is silent on the question of who has the right "to be" in Canada. It is
therefore of no assistance in determining who is "entitled to be" in Canada. If
every word in the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act is to be given independent
meaning, the class of persons entitled to be in Canada for the purpose of that
Act must be broader than the class of persons with a right to remain in Canada
for the purpose of the Immigration Act. If that is accepted, the only sensible
interpretation is that persons who enjoy the privilege of remaining in Canada
temporarily are "entitled" to be here for that time.
(B) Implications of Inconsistency With the Canada Health Act
There is no reported case in which a court has considered whether either the old
or the new OHIP definition of resident is consistent with that of the Canada
Health Act. The Health Services Appeal Board has interpreted the definition of
resident in several cases, 23 but I am not aware of any in which the validity of
21. (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 744 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Manassian].
22. R.S.A. 1980, c. A-24.
23. For example, Clarken, supra, note 10; In the Matter of a Hearing under s. 20(1)(a) of
the Health Insurance Act Between Laura Horvat and the General Manager, the Ontario
Health Insurance Plan (10 August 1995, H.S.A.B.); In the Matter of a Hearing under s.
20(1)(a) of the Health Insurance Act Between Michael David Shear and the General
Manager, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (19 June 1992, H.S.A.B.).
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the definition has been challenged on this basis. 24 Note that the old definition
under the Health Insurance Act was restricted to those legally entitled "to
remain" in Canada, whereas the Canada Health Act definition includes those
lawfully entitled "to be or to remain" in Canada. Although the old definition of
resident may have been inconsistent on its face, in practice it was interpreted to
include those with temporary entitlement to be in Canada who made their home
and were ordinarily present in Ontario.2
5
The new definition clearly is not intended to be interpreted in such a manner,
and has not been. However, an individual OHIP applicant would have to apply
for leave of the court to litigate this issue in the public interest.
In Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance),26 a welfare recipient sought a
declaration that the recovery of certain overpayments under the Manitoba Social
Allowances Act27 violated the provisions of the Canada Assistance Plan28 and
that the transfer payments to Manitoba under the Plan were therefore illegal,
and for an injunction to halt those transfer payments. The Supreme Court of
Canada held that Finlay did not have a direct interest in the sense that he would
not necessarily gain any advantage if his action succeeded, because it "cannot
be asserted for a certainty" that if the transfer payments were declared to be
illegal or even enjoined that the province would change their overpayment
recovery policy.29 The court did grant him public interest standing, and held that
the test for public interest standing to challenge the validity of a statute on
constitutional grounds also applies to cases of "administrative validity":
mo establish status as a plaintiff in a suit seeking a declaration that legislation
is invalid, if there is a serious issue as to its invalidity, a person need only show
that he is affected by it directly or that he has a genuine interest as a citizen in
the validity of the legislation and that there is no other reasonable and effec-
tive manner in which the issue may be brought before the Court.30
24. In Clarken, ibid., the new definition was challenged on the basis of inconsistency with
sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and with the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990
c. H-19.
25. Ibid. at 11-13.
26. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (sub noma. Canada (Minister of Finance) v. Finlay), 33 D.L.R.
(4th) 321 [hereinafter Finlay cited to S.C.R.].
27. R.S.M. 1970, c. S160.
28. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-I, repealed S.C. 1995, c. 17, s. 32 [hereinafter CAP].
29. Finlay, supra, note 26 at 623.
30. Ibid. at 626, quoting Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575,
130 D.L.R. (3d) 588.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Assuming standing were granted and the (Federal) court adopted the reasoning in
Hemadi over that in Manassian, it is open to the Ontario government to adopt a
definition of resident which is inconsistent with the Canada Health Act, if it is
prepared to forego the benefits which compliance with that Act confers. Given
recent amendments to federal legislation and spending policies, it may continue to
become easier for a province to contemplate foregoing those benefits.
In order to qualify for a cash contribution from the federal government under
the Canada Health Act, a province must satisfy the criteria of universality, that
is, entitle all residents 31 to equal access to health care. 32 Prior to April 1, 1996,
these cash contributions were made under CAP. Since April 1, 1996, the
contributions have been made under the Canada Health and Social Transfer.33
While CAP was a straight cash transfer, the CHST consists of "a federal income
tax reduction that would enable the provinces to impose their own tax measures
without a net increase in taxation" and a cash transfer.34 Over time, it is
envisaged that the actual cash transfer will decrease. 35 At present, the transfer
is still significant enough to ensure provincial compliance with the Canada
Health Act criteria. If federal spending on health care continues to decline,
eventually a Charter challenge may be the only way to constrain the Ontario
government.
III. THE CHARTER - SECTION 15
Section 15(1) of the Charter states that:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.36
31. Subject to four exceptions listed in s. 2, including a minimum period of residence not
exceeding three months which may be imposed by a province before eligibility com-
mences. The other exceptions are not relevant to this article.
32. Canada Health Act, supra, note 6, ss. 7 and 10.
33. Created in Part V of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
F-8, ss. 13-25 [hereinafter CHST].
34. Ibid. s.13.
35. By 1998, it is expected that federal funding will decrease by 15% of its 1995 level
(about $7 billion): C.M. Scott, "Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance
Plan" (1995) 6 Constitutional Forum 79 at 80.
36. Charter, supra, note 7.
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The first pronouncement on this section by the Supreme Court of Canada was
in Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, 37 in which McIntyre J. held that
the prohibited grounds of discrimination are not limited to those listed in section
15, but include grounds analogous to them. He stated the test for a violation of
s. 15 as follows:
The third or "enumerated and analogous grounds" approach most closely
accords with the purposes of s. 15. ... However, in assessing whether a
complainant's rights have been infringed under s. 15(1), it is not enough to
focus only on the alleged ground of discrimination and decide whether or
not it is an enumerated or analogous ground. ... A complainant under s.
15(1) must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment
before and under the law or that the law has a differential impact on him or
her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but, in addition, must show
that the legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.
38
[D]iscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individ-
ual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or dis-
advantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages avail-
able to other members of society.
39
Thus, a claimant must show first that the law creates a distinction or has a
differential impact, and second, that that distinction or differential impact
creates a burden. If the discrimination is on an enumerated ground, this com-
pletes the analysis. If it is necessary to show that the ground of distinction is
analogous, a claimant must go further:
The inquiry, in effect, concentrates upon the personal characteristics of
those who claim to have been unequally treated. Questions of stereotyping,
of historical disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the focus ... 40
In Andrews, the court found that citizenship was an analogous ground. Wilson
J. gave some further indications of why non-citizens receive the protection of
s. 15(1) of the Charter:
Relative to citizens, non-citizens are a group lacking in political power and
as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to
37. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter Andrews cited to S.C.R.].
38. Ibid. at 182.
39. Ibid. at 174.
40. Ibid. at 180, quoting Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), [1987] 2 F.C. 359 at 368-69.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
equal concern and respect violated. They are among "those groups in soci-
ety to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in
attending." 4 1
(A) Status to Invoke the Charter
Applying the s. 15 test to this case, a threshold question is whether a refugee
claimant has status to invoke the protection of the Charter. In Singh v. Minister
of Employment and Immigration, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
word "everyone" in s. 7 includes "every human being who is physically present
in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law,"'42 and not
simply citizens or permanent residents. The words "every individual" in s. 15
should be interpreted similarly, and thus extend to refugee claimants.
(B) Step I: Is there a distinction or a differential impact?
The definition of resident in Reg. 552 distinguishes between persons ordinarily
resident in Ontario who are (a) members of a group listed in s. 1.1 (b) of the
Regulation, and (b) not members of those groups.
(C) Step II: Is the distinction discriminatory?
All of the criteria in section 1.1 are related to immigration status, which is a
personal characteristic. The distinction imposes the burden, obligation or disad-
vantage of having to pay for medical care, or of receiving a more limited
provision of health care (through IFH, or emergency care from hospitals or
Community Health Clinics). Alternatively stated, the distinction withholds or
limits access to the benefit or advantage of having health care provided by the
government. Therefore, the distinction made by the regulation is discriminatory.
In Egan v. Canada, L'Heureux-Dube J. noted that:
[T]he Charter is not a document of economic rights and freedoms. Rather, it
only protects "economic rights" when such protection is necessarily inci-
dental to protection of the worth and dignity of the human person (i.e. nec-
essary to the protection of a "human right"). 4 3
What is at issue here is that a benefit is being provided by the state to some
individuals but not to others in a discriminatory manner. This is not affected by
the fact that the benefit has a monetary value. More is at stake than mere
41. Ibid. at 152.
42. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 202, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, Wilson J. [hereinafter Singh cited to
S.C.R.].
43. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 555-56, (1995) 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 [hereinafter Egan cited to
S.C.R.].
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"economic rights", and this will be further discussed below in the section on
proportionality.
Note also that in Miron v. Trudel 44 and Egan, four members of the Supreme
Court of Canada would have limited the scope of s. 15 protection by requiring
that, in order for a finding of discrimination to be made, the ground of distinction
be irrelevant to the purposes of the legislation. Thus if immigration status were
relevant to the purpose of the Health Insurance Act, there would be no s. 15
violation. That approach has been vigorously resisted by the majority of the
court, and criticized in the literature.45
(D) Step III: Is the discrimination on the basis of a prohibited ground?
There are two ways of characterizing the group which is discriminated against.
One is to say that since refugee claimants are excluded from the list of potential
residents in s. 1.1, the definition discriminates against refugee claimants. The
other way is to assert that the list discriminates on the basis of national origin,
in that persons born in Canada automatically receive Canadian citizenship and
come within s. 1.1 (1)(b)(1) of the Regulation, whereas persons born outside of
Canada only qualify for OHIP if they fall within one of the listed categories.
As discussed below, the way the group is characterized will affect the appropri-
ate remedy (if the list is discriminatory because it does not include refugee
claimants, they should be "read in" to the list; if it discriminates on the basis of
national origin then no amount of reading in of discrete groups will save it). If
the goal is to return to the pre-April 1994 definition of resident, the national
origin approach is preferable.
Note that not everyone born outside of Canada is discriminated against by the
definition - some will be citizens or permanent residents, others will fit within
the other listed categories. But it is well settled that it is not necessary that the
regulation create a burden on all members of the group to discriminate against
that group.46
If the group is to be characterized as refugee claimants, it must be shown that
they constitute an analogous ground. In Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada
44. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, (1995) 124 D.L.R. (4th) 693.
45. See for instance J. Keene, "Discrimination in the Provision of Government Services and
s. 15 of the Charter: Making the Best of the Judgements in Egan, Thibaudeau, and
Miron" (1995) 11 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 107 at 112-18.
46. See for instance Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519 at 556; Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 at 1247; Janzen v.
Pharos Restaurant, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 at 1288-89.
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held that citizenship is an analogous ground upon which discrimination is
prohibited:
The rights guaranteed in s. 15(1) apply to all persons whether citizens or
not. ... Non-citizens, lawfully permanent residents of Canada are - in the
words of the U.S. Supreme Court - a good example of a "discrete and
insular minority" who come within the protection of s. 15.47
In Andrews, the disadvantaged group in question was permanent residents. In
this case, the disadvantaged group is refugee claimants who are neither citizens
nor permanent residents. The remarks of McIntyre and Wilson JJ. about the
disadvantaged status of permanent residents are equally applicable to refugee
claimants, if not more so. Refugee claimants are a vulnerable group lacking in
political power. In fact, since as noted above a permanent resident has a right to
remain in Canada, while a refugee claimant is merely extended that privilege
temporarily, a refugee claimant is arguably more vulnerable to arbitrary govern-
ment measures than a permanent resident.
Thus, a good case can be made for extending Andrews to add refugee claimants
to the list of groups against which section 15 prohibits discrimination. On this
reasoning, or on the basis of national origin, Reg. 552 violates s. 15 of the
Charter. It remains to be seen whether the violation can be justified under s. 1.
IV. SECTION 1
Section 1 of the Charter states that:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.48
(A) The Standard of Justification
The test for justification was set out in R. v. Oakes:
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter
right or freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom".... Sec-
ond, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party
invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demon-
strably justified. This involves "a form of proportionality test."49
47. Supra, note 37 at 183 [references omitted].
48. Charter, supra, note 7.
49. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-39, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 [hereinafter Oakes cited to S.C.R.].
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In some later decisions, the court has suggested that the standard of justification
might be lower if the legislation relates to the provision of a social service or a
balancing of interests, rather than a direct conflict between the individual and
the state. In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General):
Where the legislature mediates between the competing claims of different
groups in the community ... [i]f the legislature has made a reasonable
assessment as to where the line is most properly drawn, especially if that
assessment involves weighing conflicting scientific evidence and allocating
scarce resources on this basis, it is not for the court to second guess.50
However more recently in Egan, four members of the court rejected a more
deferential approach. Iacobucci J. (Cory and McLachlin JJ. concurring) wrote
in dissent:
... [Justice Sopinka] finds this violation to be justifiable in a free and demo-
cratic society under s. 1. In reaching this conclusion, he relies heavily on
select passages from this court's judgment in McKinney v. University of
Guelph. ... These passages from McKinney may seem to support the
extremely deferential approach to s. 1 adopted by Sopinka J. However, a
close examination of the McKinney decision reveals that La Forest J.'s com-
ments therein can be said to be limited to Charter review of provincial
human rights legislation governing private relations only ...
Furthermore, I find that the context of McKinney is wholly distinguishable
from the present appeal. This appeal involves a closely held personal char-
acteristic (potentially only shared by a minority) upon which a distinction is
drawn without the array of competing interests that animated the s. I analy-
sis in McKinney. The only competing interest in the case at bar is budgetary
in nature.5 1
Moreover, the comments of Sopinka J, which were approved by Lamer C.J. and
La Forest, Gonthier and Major JJ. on the s. 1 issue, seem to suggest that this
increased deference would only be appropriate where the government has made
some incremental attempt to address a social problem, and envisages social
benefits gradually being extended to include larger segments of society:
... [G]overnment must be accorded some flexibility in extending social
benefits and does not have to be proactive in recognizing new social rela-
tionships. It is not realistic for the court to assume that there are unlimited
funds to address the needs of all. A judicial approach on this basis would
50. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 990, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, Dickson C.J. and Lamer and Wilson
JJ. [hereinafter Irwin Toy cited to S.C.R.].
51. Supra, note 43 at 617-18 [emphasis added]. See also L'Heureux-Dube's comments at
560.
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tend to make a government reluctant to create any new social benefit
schemes ...
[quoting McKinney] ... [Ilt is important to remember that a legislature
should not be obliged to deal with all aspects of a problem at once. It must
surely be permitted to take incremental measures. It must be given reason-
able leeway to deal with problems one step at a time. ... But, generally, the
courts should not lightly use the Charter to second-guess legislative judg-
ment as to just how quickly it should proceed in moving forward towards
the ideal of equality. The courts should adopt a stance that encourages legis-
lative advances in the protection of human rights. 52
Nothing in Sopinka J.'s comments, or La Forest J.'s judgment in McKinney,
contemplates retrograde actions by governments in removing benefits from a
segment of society which has come to expect and rely on those benefits.
Therefore, a lower standard of justification would be inappropriate here.
Regardless of the standard of justification, it is clear that the regulations are a
"limit prescribed by law." In evaluating whether the limit is reasonable, the first
step is to determine whether the objective of the legislation is sufficiently
important. In order to do so, of course, it is necessary to define the objective.
(B) Sufficiently Important Objective
The following are excerpted from the Minister's Statement to the Legislature:
In last year's budget we promised to tighten OHIP rules by restricting bene-
fits to residents of Ontario. The measures I am announcing today will save
the taxpayers of this province about $48 million annually....
Starting April 1st, most people who arrive in Ontario but do not plan to live
here permanently, will no longer receive free health care benefits. ... •
Our government has been implementing its plan to protect services by
spending carefully and wisely.... Maintaining the best possible care for
Ontarians remains our priority and our commitment....
These measures I have outlined today ... will help us to preserve health
care in Ontario now, and in years to come.53
The following possible purposes can be gleaned from this Statement: (1)
fulfilling a budget promise; (2) controlling costs; (3) preserving free health care
52. Ibid at 572-73.
53. Supra, note 8.
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in Ontario; (4) preserving free health care for those who intend to live in Ontario
permanently.
The purpose of the three-month waiting period for benefits can be inferred from
a news release accompanying the speech: "The waiting period is expected to
prevent people from coming to Ontario just to receive medical care, then
leaving." 54
In order for a justificatory purpose to be valid, it must be intra vires the level of
government which seeks to invoke it (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.55). Immigra-
tion is a federal power, and although citizenship is not explicitly enumerated, it
has been deemed to fall within the purview of the federal government. 56 On this
basis, I would argue that any purpose related to immigration status is ultra vires
the province of Ontario, and cannot be used to justify a Charter violation under
section 1. Thus, the province of Ontario could not argue that the purpose of the
legislation is to provide health care access to "Canadian citizens and permanent
residents ordinarily resident in Ontario." While an individual's province of
residence might be relevant to a province, immigration status could not be.
Furthermore, an individual's motive for acquiring temporary immigration status
could not be relevant. This means that while deterring opportunistic behaviour
by non-citizens (such as visiting Canada to exploit health care resources) might
be a valid purpose for the federal government, it could not be a subject of inquiry
of the province of Ontario.
This is not to suggest that a province would be required under the Charter to
provide health care to persons who are in Canada illegally. To begin with, it
could be argued that such persons are not, by definition, "amenable to Canadian
law". Even if they were, they would be unable to appear in court to mount a
Charter challenge without risking deportation, and in any case any action would
be barred as its basis would rest on the applicant's illegal act. The point is simply
54. Ministry of Health, News Release 94/nr-056 (31 March 1994). See also the question
and answer in the accompanying Backgrounder. "Will a waiting period help reduce
fraud? The waiting period is to help ensure that only people who are really planning to
live in Ontario get Health Cards. It will make it difficult for a person to come to Ontario
just to receive medical care."
55. (1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 353, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Big M cited to S.C.R.].
56. The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(25) grants the federal gov-
ernment power over "Naturalization and Aliens." In Morgan v. Prince Edward Island
(Attorney General), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 349, it was agreed by all parties and accepted by
the court that power over citizenship was conferred on the federal government either by
implication of s. 91(25) or under the general power to make laws for the peace, order
and good government of Canada.
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that, given that an individual is legally entitled to reside in Ontario, while the
length of residence or intended residence might be relevant to a valid provincial
purpose, immigration status could not be.
It might also be argued that it is within the power of the province to determine
who qualifies as a "resident" or an "ordinary resident", and that one aspect of
this definition might refer to immigration status. My argument is simply that
whether the definition is contained in the Health Insurance Act or some statute
of general application, a definition of "resident" which discriminates against
Convention refugee claimants would violate s. 15, and would have to be justified
under s. 1 with reference to some valid purpose.
The second criterion for a valid justificatory purpose is that it be consistent with
Charter values. As Dickson C.J. commented in Oakes:
(A]ny s. I inquiry must be premised on an understanding that the impugned
limit violates constitutional rights and freedoms - rights and freedoms
which are part of the supreme law of Canada...
The court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free
and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the par-
ticipation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying values and
principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which
a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reason-
able and demonstrably justified.-7
If it meets this test, the objective must also be of sufficient importance:
It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be
characterized as sufficiently important.58
It could be argued that even if "fulfilling a budget promise" promotes "faith in
social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society," it is not a sufficiently important purpose to justify
overriding a constitutional right. Furthermore, fulfilling a budget promise to
restrict health care benefits in a discriminatory way is an invalid purpose. The
analysis of Iacobucci J. in Egan provides an appropriate analogy:
57. Supra, -note 49 at 135-36 [emphasis added].
58. Ibid at 138-39.
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The importance of providing relief to some elderly couples does not justify
an infringement of the equality rights of the elderly couples who do not
benefit for constitutionally irrelevant reasons....
The only way that, at a conceptual level, this aspect of the Oakes test might
be satisfied in the appeal at bar is if the purpose of the legislation would be
construed as ameliorating the situation and fostering the existence of
elderly heterosexual couples only. ... It is clear that, were this to be the goal
of the legislation, such a goal would itself be discriminatory. The law in this
area is unequivocal: a constitutionally impermissible purpose will not save
a law under s. 1 of the Charter: R. v. Big M.59
The circularity of justifying a s. 15 breach with a discriminatory purpose can be
illustrated with a slightly different example. Suppose the provincial government
had declared its intention to preserve health care for all residents of Ontario, and
defined "resident" to mean "all males who make their home in Ontario". It is
clear that if it would be discriminatory for the government to refuse to grant
OHIP to women, it would not become more valid because of the (arbitrary)
definition of "resident" adopted. Similarly, the government cannot define "res-
ident" in such a way as to discriminate against any other group, such as refugee
claimants, and then use this definition to justify refusing to grant OHIP cover-
age. In any case, I will argue below that this objective fails on a proportionality
analysis.
Whether controlling cost can ever justify the violation of a Charter right is a
matter of some debate. Writing for the three members of the court who decided
Singh on Charter grounds, Wilson J. rejected the administrative convenience
and cost arguments put forward by the Attorney General of Canada:
... I have considerable doubt that the type of utilitarian consideration
brought forward by Mr. Bowie can constitute ajustification for a limitation
on the rights set out in the Charter. Certainly the guarantees of the Charter
would be illusory if they could be ignored because it was administratively
convenient to do so. No doubt considerable time and money can be saved
by adopting administrative procedures which ignore the principles of funda-
mental justice but such an argument, in my view, misses the point of the
exercise under s. 1.60
Even if the cost of compliance with fundamental justice is a factor to which
the courts would give considerable weight, I am not satisfied that the Minis-
ter has demonstrated that this cost would be so prohibitive as to constitute a
justification within the meaning of s. 1.61
59. Supra, note 43 at 615-16 [emphasis in original].
60. Supra, note 42 at 218-19.
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In Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 et al. v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd.6 2 and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan,63 the court held that avoidance
of economic cost to a third party could justify limitations on the right to strike
which violates s. 2(b). However, in those cases the Charter right itself was being
invoked to advance the economic interests of the applicants:
It would be strange, indeed, if our society were to give constitutional pro-
tection for the freedom of employees to advance economic, as well as non-
economic, interests by striking, while insisting that the state remain idle and
indifferent to the infliction on others of serious economic harm.64
In R. v. Lee65 and R. v. Chaulk,66 the court held that the cost of empanelling a
jury a second time or the cost of having the Crown prove the sanity of the accused
could justify violation of a s. 11(f) or s. 7 right, respectively. However in Lee,
Lamer J. notes for the majority that the "cost" of empanelling successive juries
is more than merely an economic cost:
The rationale for the section lies in the "cost" to potential jurors and to the
criminal justice system in terms of economic loss and of the disaffection
created in the community for the system of criminal justice. ... The
expense, it should be noted, is not only to the system....
I do not believe that the importance of the objective can be measured solely
by reference to the amount of money lost as a result of the non-appearance
of accused persons, and the cost of empanelling a second jury. Rather the
cost, and by implication the importance of the objective, must be measured
in terms of the overall "cost", both in the sense of economic loss and dis-
ruption to lives, and in the sense of confidence and respect for the system,
to the individuals selected for jury duty and to society as a whole.67
In Schachter v. Canada, Lamer C.J. writing for five members of the court made
an obiter comment which suggests that economic cost to government could
never justify a Charter violation: "This court has held, and rightly so, that
budgetary considerations cannot be used to justify a violation under s. 1.-68
61. Ibid. at 220.
62. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery cited to
S.C.R.].
63. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
64. Thid. at 476.
65. [1989) 2 S.C.R. 1384 [hereinafter Lee].
66. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 [hereinafter Chaulk].
67. Supra, note 65 at 1390-91.
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In Egan, Sopinka J.'s comments6 9 may signal a retreat from this position, but
L'Heureux-Dube J. noted the court's position in Schachter with approval. 70 The
other decisions did not address the issue of budgetary cost.
I conclude from this review of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions that
budgetary cost alone cannot justify a violation of a Charter right. However, if
the objective is framed in terms of maintaining an acceptable standard of health
care in Ontario, budgetary considerations may enter into the proportionality
analysis.
(B) Proportionality Test
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irratio-
nal considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objec-
tive. Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in
this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in
question. Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the
measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom,
and the objective which has been identified as of "sufficient importance. ' 71
The third branch of the proportionality test was modified by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. to encompass a weigh-
ing of the effect of the impugned measure on the right in question against not
only the objective to be achieved, but the effect the impugned measure has on
the achievement of that objective:
... At other times, however, the measure at issue, while rationally connected
to an important objective, will result in only the partial achievement of this
object. In such cases, I believe that the third step of the second branch of
the Oakes test requires both that the underlying objective of a measure and
the salutary effects that actually result from its implementation be propor-
tional to the deleterious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and
freedoms.
7 2
I would, therefore, rephrase the third part of the Oakes test as follows: there
must be a proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures
which are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the
68. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 709, 93 D.L.R. (4th) I [hereinafter Schachter cited to S.C.R.].
For the context of this remark, see text accompanying infra, note 85.
69. Quoted in the text accompanying supra, note 52.
70. Supra, note 43 at 571.
71. Oakes, supra, note 49 at 139 [emphasis in original, references omitted].
72. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 887, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, Lamer C.J. [emphasis in original].
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objective, and there must be a proportionality between the deleterious and
the salutary effects of the measures.7 3
(a) Salutary Effects - The Election Promise
It was argued above that preserving public confidence in the electoral system
might be an important objective. By a stretch, "fulfilling an electoral promise"
to contain health care costs might be rationally connected to that objective. But
the scheme enacted by the Ontario government would fail the minimal impair-
ment test, as it is possible to devise a scheme to reduce health care costs in a
non-discriminatory fashion. Thus the present scheme does not impair the equal-
ity right as little as possible. Finally, whatever small effect fulfilling this single
election promise might have on public faith in democratic institutions would
certainly be outweighed by the deleterious effect on the equality rights of
refugee claimants.
(b) Deleterious Effects
The deleterious effects on the health of refugee claimants are lower because of
the existence of IFH, but the Ontario government might not be permitted to rely
on that program in a s. 1 justification. In Egan, the four members of the court
who discussed the issue were:
... uncomfortable with basing the constitutionality of federal legislation
upon the actions of a provincial legislature over which Parliament has no
control. ... Although there might be cases in which provincial legislation or
law could be relied upon in preserving the constitutionality of federal legis-
lation, this would only be in a situation where all of the provinces have spe-
cifically ensured that the discriminatory effect of federal legislation be
eliminated through provincial enactments or law.74
There are significant differences between OHIP and IFM coverage in terms of
services available. In addition, whereas OHIP coverage is universal, IFH recip-
ients must demonstrate that they have insufficient funds to pay for their own
health care in order to qualify. Therefore, the Ontario government might not be
able to rely on IFH to demonstrate minimal impairment or proportionality.
Even with the existence of IFH, loss of OHIP coverage has had and will have
deleterious effects on the health of refugee claimants, although the extent of
these effects is difficult to quantify. Although Ontario hospitals and CHCs have
a policy of not turning away anyone in need of treatment whether or not they
have medical coverage, this policy is not shared by doctors in private practice.
Significant delays in receiving treatment can result if an individual is turned
73. Ibid at 889 [emphasis in original].
74. Supra, note 43 at 614, Iacobucci J.
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away by a practitioner (or a receptionist) who is unfamiliar with IFH. If medical
practitioners and staff do not understand the program, it is reasonable to
conclude that many refugee claimants will be unsure what services are covered,
or where they can go to receive treatment. Many new immigrants, unfamiliar
with the Canadian medical system, who are refused treatment or erroneously
billed for treatment that is provided, will be reluctant to engage the medical
system again. Many simple health problems, if left untreated, can result in
serious complications requiring expensive intervention.
Individuals who become aware of the existence of CHCs and are close enough
to one to receive health services there, are less likely to encounter problems than
those who must seek out an accommodating doctor on their own. Community
Health Centres are equipped to provide many basic medical services, and the
staff are generally familiar with IFH. When the patient must be referred out,
there are sometimes complications.
In order to determine the experience that refugee claimants have had with IFH,
I spoke with several staff workers at CHCs in Toronto about problems which
they have experienced. These interviews were conducted over the telephone
during a one-week period in April, 1996. Although the experiences reported here
may not reflect the sum of the clinics' engagement with IFH, the comments are
at least illustrative of the concerns which the program raises.
The Davenport Perth Neighbourhood Centre has found that some specialists
refuse to accept patients with IFH coverage, but since St. Joseph's Hospital does,
they now routinely send their clients there. The medical lab to which they send
clients and samples for testing simply asks for the list of services covered by
I-FH before they will do any work. After an initial period of adjustment, they
have not experienced any major problems.
Access Alliance has found that many specialists will not accept referrals of
patients covered by LFH as they are unwilling to go through the paperwork
required to bill the federal government for services provided. Lawrence Heights
CHC reported that one specialist who does accept referrals had been calling the
CHC repeatedly because he was not being paid. Apparently there is a backlog
of IFH bills, and it takes at least six months to receive payment after the bill is
submitted.
Rexdale CHC reported that many local labs are not aware of the existence of
IFH, and ask clients referred from Rexdale for payment. To address this
problem, Rexdale often sends their clients to the lab with a letter certifying that
the CHC will pay for the service. They have found it more expedient to pay for
lab services for refugee claimants out of the CHC's general budget, rather than
trying to convince the labs to bill IFH. Since they refer many patients to the
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Etobicoke General Hospital for emergency treatment, they have attempted to
educate the hospital staff about IFH. They encountered serious barriers, as the
hospital initially acted as if IFH did not exist, and staff would ask patients who
produced IFH documents for money in advance of treatment. Rexdale has
maintained a constant dialogue with the hospital on the issue, and although they
have raised the awareness and acceptance of IFH among the hospital staff they
have been unable to reach everyone, and clients they refer to the hospital still
occasionally get turned away.
4 Villages CHC seems to have had the most success dealing with specialists and
hospitals. It seems that rather than turn patients away, specialists to whom they
refer clients covered by IFH send the bills to 4 Villages. 4 Villages ignores the
bills, and explains the IFH billing procedure to anyone who calls asking for
payment.
By contrast, East End Health Services has given up. In their experience, most
specialists in Toronto refuse to accept patients covered by IFH. The most
common complaint seems to be the length of time it takes to receive payment
from the federal government. East End generally treats individuals with IFH
coverage as uninsured, and pays specialists from their general funds.
PCLS has one client, named Mariah, who has had serious problems proving that
she is eligible for IFH coverage. The generally accepted proof of coverage
(where coverage is accepted) is an Immigration form IMM 1442 B AQ
(Acknowledgement of Convention Refugee Claim) accompanied by a schedule
of benefits covered by the program. However, claimants such as Mariah who
are being landed as part of the backlog program do not have this form. Instead,
they are told to produce the letter from Immigration which confirms that there
is a credible basis to their refugee claim and that they will therefore be landed
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. However even those practitioners
and administrators who are familiar with IFH are not generally aware that this
exception for backlog claimants exist.
Mariah is 55 years old and has a serious heart condition. She has been to several
doctors who have refused to treat her. Finally, in January 1996 she was experi-
encing serious chest pains, and called an ambulance which took her to Humber
Memorial Hospital for emergency treatment. Again, the hospital refused to
accept that she was eligible for IFH, and has sent her at least three bills
demanding payment for the hospital visit and the ambulance ride. A student at
PCLS called Immigration to confirm that Mariah is eligible for FHM and to
determine what documents she must produce to prove her status. He then began
telephoning the hospital to sort out the problem. After several phone calls he
managed to convince a person in the hospital billing office that Mariah was
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eligible, and the person agreed to explain this to the person in charge of IFH
administration for the hospital. Several weeks later, Mariah received her third
bill. The PCLS student finally spoke to the person in charge of IFH administra-
tion on April 11, and it was expected that the matter would end there, three
months after Mariah's hospital visit. Two weeks later, at the time of this writing,
the PCLS student was again negotiating with the hospital billing staff on the
same issue.
Mariah is unable to work because of her medical condition, and is receiving
welfare. The extended battle with private practitioners and hospital staff, and
the constant worry of how she would pay the hospital bill, has cost her a great
deal of time and energy, and cannot have improved her health. It has certainly
made her reluctant to visit a hospital or call an ambulance in the future.
The staff at CHCs and Community Legal Clinics (CLCs) have had some time
to gain experience with IFH, and are more comfortable than many newcomers
negotiating with specialists and hospital billing staff. Despite these advantages,
their experience with IFH has often been frustrating. Mariah's experience
demonstrates that, with the proper assistance, it is (we still hope) possible to get
adequate medical treatment free of charge. A refugee claimant who does not
perceive lack of access to health care as a legal issue, or whose lawyer will only
assist under the strict terms of the client's legal aid certificate, may give up after
being refused treatment the first time.
Denial of OHIP coverage may have substantial effects on the health or the
economic situation of refugee claimants. Perhaps the most severe effect is the
perpetuation of alienation and disadvantage that stems from the Ontario
government's validation of a discriminatory distinction, and the use of that
distinction to deny one of the basic rights extended to virtually everyone else
living in Canada. L'Heureux-Dube J.'s comments about the effects of govern-
ment discrimination against homosexuals in Egan are applicable:
[The Charter breach (i.e. the discriminatory effect) is quite severe. The dis-
crimination ... arises on the face of the legislation. ... In addition, the
impugned distinction is in an Act that plays an important role in a very
important Canadian social institution. The interest at issue is a fundamental
one ... and the non-recognition is complete, rather than partial. Although
the claimants are not necessarily economically worse off as a result of their
exclusion ... the complete exclusion from the program ... has a significant
discriminatory impact in terms of perpetuating prejudice, stereotyping, and
marginalization ... 75
75. Supra, note 43 at 570.
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Thus even if IFH provided, in theory or in practice, equivalent health care
coverage, which it does not, the very fact that refugee claimants are singled out
for different treatment is exclusionary and differentiating, and would violate s.
15 for that reason alone. The psychological effects of being treated differently,
and of virtually being accused by the Minister of Health of having come to
Canada to defraud Ontario's health care system, are deleterious effects to be
considered in s. 1.
(c) Salutary Effects - Cost Control And Preserving Health Care
Denying health care coverage to refugee claimants would free up resources to
provide additional coverage to other Ontario residents. But it fails the rational
connection test if, as I have argued above, immigration status is an impermissi-
ble criterion for the Ontario government. Even if I am wrong and the measure
passes the rational connection and minimal impairment tests, I would argue that
the deleterious effects of violating the equality guarantee are far out of propor-
tion to the salutary effect of reduced cost to the public purse.
The government of Ontario estimates that restricting eligibility for health care
will save $30 million per year. By the government's own calculation this
amounts to $1,071 per refugee claimant. In 1992-93, the Ontario government
spent over $19 billion on health care. 76 Thus the $30 million savings represents
less than one fifth of one percent of health care expenditures in the province, or
$2.77 per resident.77
While the court has suggested it might be willing to consider cost in a s. 1 analysis,
it has been quite clear that the cost must be significant, or even "prohibitive. '78 In
RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, in which the right itself was invoked to further an
economic interest, and so the standard for justification was lower than it would be
otherwise, the violation was saved by s. 1 because "the economic harm threatened
by a total work stoppage in the dairy processing industry was so immediate, of
such a high degree and of such an intense focus ...- 79
76. Health Canada, Green Book Tables: Provincial Government Health Expenditures and
Related Federal Contributions 1974-75 to 1992-93 (Ottawa, July 1994) at 9.
77. In 1993 there were 10,813,000 people living in Ontario: Statistics Canada, Annual
Demographic Statistics 1994 (Ottawa, 1994). Again, if the expected savings announced
by the Minister are based on accurate figures, this means that on a per capita basis, a
refugee claimant uses only 61% of the health care resources of an average Ontario resi-
dent.
78. Singh, supra, note 42 at 220.
79. Supra, note 63 at 480, Dickson C.J. [emphasis added].
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In this case, the economic cost is not focused on any segment of society, it is
distributed broadly through the tax system. It is such a small proportion of total
health care expenditures in Ontario that it can hardly be considered prohibitive.
Therefore, the burden which the government claims Convention refugee claimants
place on the health care system cannot justify terminating their health care benefits.
Moreover, the government's calculations are open to dispute. To begin with, the
bulk of refugee claimants' health care costs are simply being transferred to the
IFH and the federal government, and do not constitute a saving at all. The only
savings come from services which are not offered under [FH and are no longer
available to refugee claimants. In calculating the salutary effect of the measure,
a better approximation would be the difference between actual expenditures
under IFH and expected expenditures under OHIP.
Even this figure would be too high, for two reasons. First, some refugee claimants
will receive services not covered by IFH by attending Community Health Clinics
(CHCs). CHCs routinely provide services for people who cannot provide proof of
OHIP coverage for a variety of reasons, including having lost their card, or having
neglected to apply. Although CHCs are expected by the government to establish
that the patients they treat are eligible to receive OHIP coverage, in practice they
bill the Ontario government for a number of patients who are not.80
Second, the acceptance rate for refugee claimants in Canada is approximately
60%.81 The vast majority of successful claimants become permanent residents
of Canada, and therefore eligible for OHIP under the current regulations. Any
increased medical costs for successful claimants resulting from the deferral of
treatment which is not covered by IFH but would have been covered by OHIP
must be deducted from the calculated cost savings.
Even if this remaining cost is of sufficient importance to justify a s. 15 violation,
the measure adopted by the Ontario government is not minimally impairing. The
same savings could be had by requiring refugee claimants to pay for services
not covered by IFH, as is the case now, but refunding these payments to
successful refugees who become eligible for OHIP. In my opinion this would
still fail the s. 1 test, but if I am wrong, it nonetheless demonstrates that a
measure could have been enacted which impairs the equality right less than the
current regulation.
80. This information was provided by a staff worker at a CHC in Toronto.
81. From 1990 to 1994, the acceptance rates, defined as the number of claims upheld
divided by the sum of the number heard and the number withdrawn or abandoned, were
70%, 64%, 57%, 46% and 61% respectively. Refugee Update (1994) No. 22, Jesuit
Refugee Service at 2; Immigration and Refugee Board Annual Report (1994) at 10.
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V. REMEDY
A detailed discussion of remedies is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few
notes are in order. Section 52 of the Charter asserts that any law that is
inconsistent with the Charter is, "to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
and effect."' 82 However s. 24(1) provides:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circum-
stances. 83
In Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board),84 the court held that the primary
concern in selecting a remedy is to apply the measures that will best vindicate
the values expressed in the Charter and to provide the form of remedy to those
whose rights have been violated that best achieves that objective. Remedies
include, but are not restricted to, a declaration that the law is of no force or effect
under s. 52(1), reading down the law or conferring a constitutional exemption.
A declaration that the Health Insurance Act is invalid would not further the
equality value of the Charter, since in that case refugee claimants covered by
IFH would have greater health care access than other Ontario residents. Some
group disadvantaged relative to refugee claimants (if one exists) would have a
valid Charter challenge. A declaration of invalidity would arguably violate s. 7
since deprivation of a minimum level of health care impacts on the right to life.
Substantively, a declaration of invalidity would be of no benefit to refugee
claimants, and have a substantial adverse impact on the general population.
A less intrusive remedy, more in keeping with the legislative objective, would
be to read Convention refugee claimants in to the Health Insurance Act. Once
again, as noted in Schachter, this raises the issue of cost:
Even where extension by way of reading in can be used to further the legis-
lative objective through the very means the legislature has chosen, to do so
may, in some cases, involve an intrusion into budgetary decisions which
cannot be supported. This court has held, and rightly so, that budgetary con-
siderations cannot be used to justify a violation under s. 1. However, such
considerations are clearly relevant once a violation which does not survive
s. 1 has been established, s. 52 is determined to have been engaged and the
court turns its attention to what action should be taken thereunder.
82. Supra, note 7.
83. Charter, supra, note 7.
84. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 70.
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Any remedy granted by a court will have some budgetary repercussions
whether it be a saving of money or an expenditure of money. Striking down
or severance may well lead to an expenditure of money.... In determining
whether reading in is appropriate then, the question is not whether courts
can make decisions that impact on budgetary policy, it is to what degree
they can appropriately do so. A remedy which entails an intrusion into this
sphere so substantial as to change the nature of the legislative scheme in
question is clearly inappropriate. 85
The appropriate consideration is whether striking down or reading in
resolves the Charter violation in a manner least intrusive to the legislative
sphere. I would argue that if budgetary considerations have entered into the
proportionality analysis, and the budgetary impact has been found to be
minimal, the analysis need not be repeated here. In the case at bar, reading
in refugee claimants to the list of persons eligible for OHIP coverage is the
remedy which vindicates the equality rights of refugee claimants and least
impacts the legislative sphere.
Of course, if the ground of distinction identified in the s. 15 analysis was national
origin, reading in refugee claimants would not suffice. A complete solution
would be to strike the definition of resident in s. 1.1 of the Reg. 552, and either
revert to the definition previously contained in the Act, or to a common law
definition of resident. This would be a more intrusive remedy, and a court might
be reluctant to impose it, particularly if reading in refugee claimants would
satisfy the equality rights of the claimant(s) before the court. To achieve this
remedy, it might be necessary to co-ordinate a number of simultaneous actions,
so that the pool of applicants before the court would be sufficiently diverse to
make reading in a new clause for each of them equally uncomfortable.
Regardless of the remedy, the three-month waiting period will still apply. It
should also be noted that if instead of striking the section refugee claimants are
read in, they would still be subject to the requirements of s. 1.1(2)(b). The
"presence" requirement in s. 1.1(2)(b)(ii) could be used to delay approval until
the applicant had lived in Ontario for 6 months, at which time coverage would
be granted retroactive to the end of the three-month waiting period.
A potentially more difficult issue is whether a refugee claimant can satisfy the
requirement of s. 1.1(2)(b)(i) that he or she "intends to make his or her
permanent and principle home in Ontario". The government might argue that
since a refugee claimant does not (yet) have the right to remain in Ontario
"permanently", he or she is not capable of forming the intention to do so. Of
85. Supra, note 68 at 709-10.
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course, one can intend to do that which is not legally permissible. Since most
refugee claims are successful, many claimants probably expect that their claim
will succeed, and expect and intend to remain in Ontario permanently. A court,
or the Health Services Appeal Board, should simply examine the circumstances
of the refugee claimant the same way they determine the place of residence of
any other applicant - based on the amount of time they spend away from the
province, whether they have a domicile or other assets abroad, and other indicia
of intent to build a life in Ontario. The vast majority of refugee claimants would
have no difficulty satisfying this type of analysis, particularly if the Board were
sensitive to the reasons a person fleeing persecution might leave assets behind.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS - CAN A CHARTER ACTION
SUCCEED?
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitu-
tions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these
are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law,
no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no consti-
tution, no law, no court to save it.86
There are a number of barriers to Charter litigation which must be considered
in any discussion of whether a particular action will succeed on its merits. One
barrier of particular importance to a poverty law clinic is, of course, cost.
Evidently, any refugee claimant to whom the cost of health care is an issue will
not have the resources to mount a Charter challenge.
A newspaper report in 1985 estimated that the cost of taking a criminal
[Charter] case to the Supreme Court of Canada 'can be more than $34,500',
while those bringing non-criminal cases under the Charter 'should be pre-
pared to spend at least $200,000'. The operative words are 'at least'. A
woman from Ontario recently reported spending $200,000 on a Charter
case that had not yet reached the Ontario Court of Appeal. A challenge
brought by college instructor Merv Lavigne against the use of union dues
for political causes cost the National Citizens Coalition, the right-wing
lobby funding the case, $400,000 before the trial judge ever rendered a
decision. 87
86. L. Hand, "The Spirit of Liberty", in I. Dillard, ed., The Spirit of Liberty - Papers and
Addresses of Learned Hand (New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1959) 143 at 144.
87. A. Petter, "Canada's Charter Flight: Soaring Backwards into the Future"(1989) 16 J.L.
& Soc. 151 at 155-56.
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If this barrier can be overcome, which is no small feat, some commentators have
argued that two factors make poverty law claims less likely to succeed than other
Charter challenges. First, the interpretation of Charter guarantees is shaped by
previous challenges, which will have been brought by the economically power-
ful and will reflect their concerns. Second, judges will, given their socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds, be ill-disposed to consider that an economic benefit
conferred by the state (necessitating a reallocation of resources) is a right worthy
of the same protection as a positive liberty of individual action. 88
Some characteristics of the OHIP issue make a challenge more likely to receive
a favourable ruling than other social benefit cases. First, the legislation discrim-
inates on its face against refugee claimants, so it is not necessary to demonstrate
an adverse impact. Second, while courts have been reluctant to use s. 15 to
expand a government program to include a new class of beneficiaries, perhaps
out of fear of imposing substantial and ever-increasing burdens on the public
purse, this is a case where a benefit had been conferred on a disadvantaged
group, and has subsequently been taken away. This is precisely the sort of case
where the discriminatory treatment is easy to see, and easy to remedy.
As for the issue of cost, while public interest advocacy groups will continue to
have funds available to litigate significant issues, there are more such issues
than funds. It is worth noting that at the time of this writing (April 1996), four
Community Legal Clinics are involved in the preliminary stages of a Charter
challenge to the three-month residency requirement which was introduced
concurrently with the changed definition of resident. Perhaps at some time in
the near future, this issue will rise to the top of some organization's list of
litigation priorities.
Equality is a value to which all Community Legal Clinics should and do ascribe
importance. Moreover, as indicated above, the procedural and economic barriers
which are raised by the substitution of IFH for OHIP can have profound effects
on the lives of our clients, impairing their ability to put forward a successful
refugee claim, and to remain in Canada pending its final determination. Health
care should not be thought of as an issue peripheral to Immigration law, but as
a core interest of our clients.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, Convention refugee claimants in Canada are a disadvantaged group
subject to the protection of the equality guarantees of s. 15 of the Charter. The
88. See for instance ibid. at 156-7; I. Morrison, "Poverty Law and the Charter: The Year in
Review" (1990) 6 J.L. & Social Pol'y I at 17 and following.
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Health Insurance Act constitutes aprimafacie violation of this provision. There
are four objectives of the legislation which can be postulated: (1) discouraging
individuals from coming to Canada for the purpose of obtaining health care; (2)
fulfilling a budget promise; (3) controlling government expenditures; (4) main-
taining adequate health coverage for Ontarians. The first objective is ultra vires
the province of Ontario. The second objective would probably not be raised by
the province, but if it were, it is a discriminatory and therefore invalid purpose.
Furthermore, the recent changes to the Health Insurance Act have only tenuous
effects on the objective, which are outweighed by the deleterious effects of the
Charter violation. The third objective is arguably invalid as well, and more
properly considered as an aspect of the fourth. The fourth objective is valid, but
the Act does not minimally impair the equality right since an across the board
cut in health care expenditures would achieve the same object, and in any case
the cost savings are out of proportion to the severe deleterious effects the
changes to the Act have on the equality which the Charter guarantees to every
individual in Canada, including Convention refugee claimants.
The most appropriate remedy would be to amend the definition of resident in
the Health Insurance Act, to include refugee claimants (at a minimum) or to
remove all references to immigration status and returning to the prior definition.
If the purpose of the statute is to provide health care to residents of Ontario, then
it should do so, regardless of the reasons they became residents.
How we treat the most disadvantaged members of our society is a measure of
our compassion and our humanity. As a signatory to the United Nations Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees,8 9 Canada has undertaken to provide
refuge and protection to individuals fleeing life-threatening persecution in their
country of origin. This protection must extend to equal access to health care
while they await the determination of their claims. Anything less will have
serious repercussions on our international reputation, the health of our future
citizens, and the moral fibre of our society.
89. 28 July 1951, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6.
